INTRODUCTION
Autonomous driverless cars have recently received much publicity with successful demonstrations by Google, whose self-driving car has completed over 700,000 autonomous-driving miles across cities in the United States. 1 Levinson et al., [1] present algorithms used in "Junior," Stanford's autonomous vehicle that is capable of performing complex driving tasks in real time in unpredictable traffic conditions. While these ambitious forward-looking projects are currently in the proof-of-concept stage, lower levels of function-specific automation like cruise control (CC), and combined function automation 2 such as adaptive CC (ACC) are already finding their way into deployment in certain high-end automobiles. Cooperative ACC (CACC) is an extension to ACC that leverages inter-vehicle communications to create tightly coupled vehicle stream [2] .
To achieve automated cooperative driving, vehicles need to have access to each other's information. Such information enhances the ability of the autonomous vehicle to plan ahead and make better decisions to improve the overall safety and performance of the vehicle. One possible way of achieving inter-vehicle communication is through vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). We refer to vehicles that participate in information sharing and cooperative driving through VANET communications as a connected vehicle stream. Although VANET technologies have matured over time, they are still riddled with security issues. Engoulou et al. [3] present the most recent survey of various security issues in VANETs including security requirements, attacks, and privacy protection. Faults in software components can potentially lead to devastating effects for autonomous vehicles and other vehicles sharing the roadway. Thus, it is important to design the system to be robust, secure against malicious attacks, privacy preserving, and fault tolerant.
The Security Credential Management System (SCMS), developed under a cooperative agreement with the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), is currently the leading candidate for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) security backend design in the United States [4] . These efforts focus on securing the V2X communication channels over the Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) standard. Relatively little attention has been given to the safety and security of VANET control protocols in autonomous vehicles, and the impact of different security attacks in the presence of an adversary and bad-faith participants. Compromising sensor input or control protocols can lead to incorrect decisions being made by autonomous vehicles, leading to dynamic interactions between vehicles that threaten the stability and safety of autonomous vehicle streams.
Blum et al. [5] argue that jamming attacks can cause collisions in a vehicle platoon, leading
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AUTOMOTIVE NETWORKING AND APPLICATIONS

Analysis of Security Risks in an Autonomous Vehicle Stream:
We perform a study of the security vulnerabilities and risks associated with deploying VANET communication in connected vehicle streams to achieve automated sensing and control such as CACC. We consider various types of what-if scenarios when communications between autonomous vehicles participating in CACC are compromised. In addition, we examine existing countermeasures, and explore the limitations of these methods and possible ways to alleviate negative effects. 
COOPERATIVE ADAPTIVE CRUISE CONTROL
CACC is an enhancement of ACC, and we consider it as a case study of cooperative driving of autonomous vehicles. CACC incorporates wireless V2V communication to access rich preview information about surrounding vehicles. This leads to tighter following gaps and faster response to changes than ACC, and makes collaborative driving such as platooning feasible. In this study, parameter exchange in a CACC vehicle stream is done through beacons, which are periodic single-hop messages broadcast by each vehicle.
We consider a CACC vehicle stream that is moving on a straight single-lane highway. The vehicles utilize a simple one-vehicle look-ahead communication scheme shown in Fig. 1a . Each CACC vehicle listens to beacon messages sent wirelessly using IEEE 802.11p from its immediately preceding vehicle. The vehicles then utilize the speed, position, acceleration, and other information embedded in these beacon messages to achieve distributed longitudinal control. Details on the CACC control design are discussed in [2] .
We assume that the platoon of vehicles is already formed and is traveling on a straight single-lane highway with no need to change the platoon size or perform maneuvers (split, merge, leave, etc). There will be no need for a platoon management protocol, and the platoon leader acts only as the first vehicle in the platoon and creates disturbance by slowing down or speeding up. Thus, the only active communication between CACC vehicles is beaconing used to exchange necessary parameters for a longitudinal controller.
SECURITY ATTACKS ON A CACC VEHICLE STREAM
We group the security attacks on a CACC vehicle stream as application layer, network layer, system level, and privacy leakage attacks. All these attacks can potentially impact the string stability of the system, and compromise the safety and privacy of the passengers of the CACC vehicle stream. Such attacks can be launched by either an outsider or insider adversary. While leveraging state-of-the-art security architectures can potentially limit the capabilities of outsider attacks, there can still be disruptive insider attacks. In the following subsections, we discuss the various categories of security attacks in more depth.
APPLICATION LAYER ATTACKS
Application layer attacks affect the functionality of a particular application such as CACC beaconing, or message exchange in the platoon management protocol. The adversary can use message falsification (modification), spoofing (masquerading), or replay attacks to maliciously affect the vehicle stream. The impact of such attacks can be temporary instability in the vehi- In a message falsification attack, the adversary starts listening to the wireless medium and, upon receiving each beacon, manipulates the content meaningfully and rebroadcasts it as depicted in Fig. 2a . Changing the value of different fields in a beacon might have different effects on the system depending on the implementation of the vehicle's longitudinal control system. For instance, changing the acceleration field might have a more significant effect than changing the velocity.
In a spoofing attack, the adversary impersonates another vehicle in the stream in order to inject fraudulent information into a specific vehicle. In one-vehicle look-ahead communication, the adversary can impersonate the vehicle preceding the target vehicle even when the attacker is physically distant from the target vehicle. Note that an in-transit traffic tampering attack in order to modify, delay, or drop messages is not applicable in a CACC vehicle stream. This is due to the fact that all communications are single-hop, and no vehicle acts as a relay node in the system.
In a replay attack, the adversary receives and stores a beacon sent by a member of the stream and tries to replay it at a later time with malicious intent. The replayed beacon contains old information, which can lead to hazardous effects. For instance, consider a scenario where a CACC vehicle stream is moving forward with speed of 30 m/s (108 km/h). The adversary captures a beacon, and stores it for later use. When the leading vehicle slows down, the adversary injects the old beacon into the system periodically. Following vehicles still think that the lead vehicle is driving at 30 m/s and do not slow down, potentially leading to a collision.
State-of-the-art security architectures employing a strong cryptographic system have the potential to effectively thwart application layer attacks in the case where the adversary is an untrusted outsider. Digital signatures provide data integrity for beacon messages and protect them from unauthorized change. In addition to data integrity, digital signatures also provide authentication (both peer entity and data-origin authentication), as well as non-repudiation (with the help of a trusted third party) services. Moreover, using nonce in the messages, which is an arbitrary number (chosen in a pseudo-random process) used only once in communication, is a technique to prevent replay attacks.
Although the above methods are well known, there are practical challenges involved in deployment, implementation, and standardization of such security architectures in VANETs. This is due to the scale of the proposed VANET and varying interpretations of what constitutes "security and privacy" in various areas of the world [3] . Furthermore, in the case where the adversary is a trusted insider such as a compromised vehicle with a valid certificate, the problem is much harder to solve. Typical approaches to handling this issue are via misbehavior/anomaly detection techniques such as [7] , which require multiple sources of data that may not always be available. In addition, such techniques do not guarantee perfect detection in all circumstances, and are usually associated with finite false negative and false positive rates. There is much left to be done in the anomaly detection field to ensure acceptable performance of these algorithms to ensure the safety of passengers in the fully autonomous driving scenario.
NETWORK LAYER ATTACKS
Unlike application layer attacks, network layer attacks have the potential to affect the functioning of multiple user applications. For instance, the adversary can attempt a denial-of-service (DoS) or distributed DoS (DDoS) attack to overwhelm the communication capability of a 
A known method to realize DoS in the VANET scenario is by using a vehicular botnet. Mevlut et al. [8] demonstrate the problems vehicular botnets introduce to the autonomous car setting via a simulation study. In their work, they focus on producing physical congestion in a given road segment and do not discuss the effects of network level congestion through botnets of compromised cars. It is envisioned that autonomous cars are equipped with a tamperproof hardware security module (HSM), which is responsible for storing digital keys as well as performing all cryptographic operations, such as message signing/verification, encryption, and hashing [9] . These cryptographic operations are complex and CPU-intensive; hence, there is an upper bound on the number of cryptographic operations a HSM can perform at a time. A DoS/DDoS attack can target this limitation to overwhelm an autonomous vehicle and make its HSM unavailable.
Radio jamming to deliberately disrupt communications over small or wide geographic areas, as depicted in Fig. 2c , is another possible network layer DoS attack. IEEE 802.11p standard uses one control channel (CCH) with multiple service channels (SCHs). The adversary can use different jamming techniques like one-channel jamming or swiping between all channels and trying to jam them all. We would need a system such as [10] to help detect and mitigate such attacks. Other countermeasures for DoS attacks in CACC vehicle streams involve traditional solutions such as channel switching, technology switching, frequency hopping, and utilizing multiple radio transceivers. If none of these techniques are feasible, a CACC vehicle may need to downgrade to the ACC system to help avoid a rear-end collision.
SYSTEM-LEVEL ATTACKS
All presented attacks so far have been centered around exploiting V2V communication in a CACC vehicle stream. Another type of attack is tampering with vehicle hardware or software, which can be done by a malicious insider at the manufacturing level or by an outsider in an unattended vehicle (e.g., by replacing or altering certain vehicle sensors). Even if the communication channel is secure, and a state-of-the-art security architecture is deployed in the VANET if the onboard hardware/software is tampered with or faulty, the input information to the system will not be accurate. This affects the operation of the high-level protocols as illustrated in Fig. 2d . Hence, the risk of tampering should not be neglected.
One possible solution is to use tamper-proof sensors. If a tamper-proof version is not available or too expensive to deploy on a large scale, the misbehavior detection techniques discussed below can be useful. It is worth mentioning that in general, the term tamper-proof hardware means 100 percent secure against tampering, which is mostly used by marketing specialists and does not exist in practice. There are different technologies to make a device less vulnerable against tampering, and tamper resistance, tamper evidence, tamper detection, and tamper response are more accurate terms used to characterize such technologies [11] , but these are out of the scope of this article.
PRIVACY LEAKAGE ATTACKS
CACC vehicles periodically broadcast beacons that contain various types of information such as vehicle identity, current vehicle position, speed, and acceleration. The availability of this information can comprise the privacy. The adversary can carry out an eavesdropping attack, as shown in Fig. 2b , to extract valuable information about the vehicle stream such as its trace by linking position data, and use it for her own benefit. The presence of signatures in the beacon messages can worsen the situation, and allow the adversary to easily identify the participating vehicles in the CACC stream.
Eavesdropping is a type of passive attack, and hence is difficult to detect, especially in broadcast wireless communication. However, it is possible to prevent the success of eavesdropping by using encryption to achieve data privacy or using anonymity techniques to achieve identity and location privacy. Anonymity is typically implemented using group signatures [12] or short-term certificates (pseudonyms) [13] . Many privacy-preserving security architectures in VANETs use pseudonym-based schemes to keep the information private, but their applicability in a platoon requires more detailed investigation, and is out of the scope of this article.
SIMULATION STUDY SIMULATION SETTING
In order to study some of the discussed attacks on a CACC vehicle system, we utilize the VEN-TOS platform. 3 VENTOS is an integrated simulator, and is made up of many different modules, including Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) and OMNET++/Veins. SUMO 4 is adopted as our traffic simulator, while OMNET++ 5 is used to simulate the wireless communication. Our ACC and CACC car-following models are implemented to replace the default car-following model in SUMO. Moreover, the traffic control interface (TraCI), which is responsible for data/command exchange between SUMO and OMNET++, is extended with a new set of commands to gain necessary control over parameters exchange for ACC/CACC vehicles. Detailed packet-level simulation is performed in OMNET++, and IEEE 802.11p protocol, the standard protocol adopted for V2V communication in Vehicles in Network Simulation (Veins) framework, 6 is used for wireless communication between CACC vehicles.
VENTOS allows us to study situations where driverless vehicles utilize V2V communication to achieve CACC, and analyze the local and string stability of the system under different speed profiles. Stability is a critical requirement for both ACC and CACC control system design, and is achieved by dampening traffic flow disturbances [14] . Local stability concerns one vehicle following a preceding vehicle. A system is said to be local stable if the magnitude of disturbance decreases with time. String stability, also referred to as platoon stability and asymptotic stability, concerns the propagation of disturbance in a string of vehicles. String stable means disturbance damps out when propagating to upstream vehicles.
We present simulation results of performing application and network layer security attacks with a malicious insider adversary. The insider adversary is on the side of the road with fixed position and is equipped with a radio to communicate with other vehicles in the network. In the application layer attack, we consider message falsification through which the adversary modifies the CACC beacon messages in order to affect the stream. In the network layer attack, we consider radio jamming through which all wireless communications are disrupted. Figure 3 shows the speed profile of 10 autonomous/driveless CACC vehicles moving on a straight single-lane highway when no insider adversary is present. The first vehicle (platoon leader) is referred to as Veh 1, and its speed profile is given and shown with a dashed blue line. As Veh 1 accelerates and decelerates, the disturbance propagates to the following vehicles. At t = 120 s, Veh 1 accelerates at 1.5 m/s 2 to a cruise speed of 20 m/s. Then it decelerates to 5 m/s with deceleration of -2 m/s 2 . The other nine vehicles follow with uniform time gap setting. As can be seen, the system is stable, and vehicles follow each other smoothly. Figure 4 presents the speed profile of the same vehicle stream in the presence of a malicious insider vehicle that is using a message falsification attack in order to compromise the system. At t = 147 s, the CACC vehicle stream enters into the radio range of the adversary and is affected by it. The adversary tries to manipulate the acceleration field of beacon messages to a fixed value of 6 m/s 2 . Due to the fact that no security features are implemented in vehicles, they accept the falsified beacons and use them for longitudinal control, which leads to string instability in the stream, and this disturbance magnifies through the stream. Here, a falsification attack is most effective when a sudden change in acceleration occurs.
RESULTS
We note that since the attacker in this case is an insider, cryptographic security in terms of digital signatures/certificates by itself will not be able to prevent the attack. We will need more elaborate misbehavior detection measures, as mentioned earlier, to help mitigate this problem. In essence, the speed profile of the vehicle stream will look similar to the one in Fig. 4 even in the presence of security measures such as digital signatures/certificates. Figure 5 illustrates the space gap between vehicles before and after a radio jamming attack. Before radio jamming, the space gap is 16 m when the CACC vehicle stream is traveling at a speed of 20 m/s (mark 1) and 5.5 m at a speed of 5 m/s (mark 2). The insider adversary disrupts all communications in CCH starting from t = 308 s (mark 3). When failing to receive beacons, CACC vehicles downgrade to ACC mode with larger time gap and delay settings. As a result, the space gap is increased to 26 m (mark 4), and the reaction of followers to speed changes becomes relatively slower (mark 5). Downgrading to ACC is a simple countermeasure that diminishes the impact of radio jamming from a rear-end collision to reduction in CACC performance. We leave designs of more elaborate countermeasures to the insider jamming attack for future work.
POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES FOR DETECTING MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR
In this section, we explore some possibilities to help secure CACC vehicle streams by detecting compromised or faulty sensors/vehicles. These could have implications for vehicles with varying levels of automation, from WAVE-enabled vehicles with ACC/CACC capabilities to fully automated driverless vehicles.
LOCAL PLAUSIBILITY CHECK
A simple approach to detecting a faulty sensor is to check whether or not the incoming information is plausible [15] . For instance, if a sensor is not reading within its normal range, the sensor may be faulty or tampered with. The incorrect information can be either discarded or interpolated from the past correct information. Another possibility is deriving the information from other relevant sensors. For instance, if the wheel speed sensor is compromised and faulty, the velocity can be derived from the engine speed sensor.
WEARABLES AND MOBILE DEVICES
Wearable devices such as the Google Glass and mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets carry a wide array of sensors such as cameras, accelerometers, and GPS units along with wireless communication capability. These devices are carried by the driver or passengers of a vehicle. This opens up rich opportunity for developing applications that can potentially improve the security and safety of the system. For instance, the wearable/mobile device of a driver or passenger can act as a verifier for the sensing data generated or received by the vehicle. The wearable device can construct a "belief" from its sensor data about the position of the vehicle, velocity, or acceleration, and cross-check this with the belief computed by the vehicle. If there is a discrepancy in the beliefs as seen from the wearable device and the vehicle, it might be an indicator of a security compromise of the hardware or software in the car, or in the communication channel. If the passenger has multiple devices, it might be possible to fuse the sensor information from these devices to construct a more well formed belief, which can then be checked against the vehicle's belief.
VOTING
The two approaches described above are based on local detection of misbehaving sensors/software or compromised communication. If this fails, collaborative decision-making techniques such as voting could be carried out that enable vehicles to collectively shield themselves against a misbehaving vehicle. Voting is most effective in scenarios where there are multiple vehicles in a group that are coordinating with one another. A group of vehicles can be defined as nearby vehicles driving within a geographic region or members of a vehicle platoon. Vehicles in a group keep track of each other's behavior, and check for anomalies in the data received from the members of the group and possibly other vehicles on the road. The vehicles then perform a trust computation and vote for/against keeping the vehicle in the group. This process needs to be done at regular intervals and therefore incurs communication overheads. More detailed study is needed to understand the trade-offs between performance and cost.
CONCLUSION
Mainstream car manufacturers such as Tesla, BMW, and Audi are all working on commercial versions of vehicles with varying levels of automation embedded in them. With the increased reliance on sensors and computer software to make driving decisions for passengers, addressing security issues will become very important with time. This work is an attempt to gain better understanding of the security risks involved in connected vehicle streams, from WAVE-enabled vehicles with ACC/CACC capabilities to fully automated driverless vehicles. We analyze different security attacks on a vehicle stream and discuss the possible security design decisions that will need to be taken to ensure the safety of the system. The impact of a security attack, such as rear-end collision or instability of the stream, is shown with the help of simulation where we implement the ACC/CACC longitudinal control and perform a detailed packet-level simulation. 
